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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will deal with the recent history of bribery law in the United
Kingdom, 1 and introduce and consider the effects of the Bribery Act 2010,
specifically so far as concerns prosecution practice. It will show that the history
of the first decade of the twenty-first century was one in which the United
Kingdom finally and reluctantly gave up the idea that the essence of bribery is
that it is an offence of disloyalty and embraced the idea that bribery undermines
the proper operation of markets. This was not a smooth path from acceptance at
an intellectual level that the offence is part of competition law to the
formulation of an offence giving this realisation effect. Rather it was a messy,
chaotic, and highly politicised sequence of events which, it is suggested, is far
more typical of criminal lawmaking. Far from the achievement of an objective
by the conscious agency of one or a group of individuals, the law reform
process took at least one wrong turn and was delayed for several years by
political happenstance. 2 It was not put back on the right track by the power of
* Joe Palazzolo, Law Blog Job of Week: SFO Director, WALL ST. J.L. BLOC (Oct. 25,
2011, 1:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/25/law-blog-job-of-week-sfo-director/.
t Drapers' Professor of Law, Queen Mary, University of London. This is a revised and
updated version of a paper delivered at the Ohio State Law Journal Symposium in
Columbus, Ohio on March 16, 2012. My thanks to those present who commented, as well as
Jeremy Horder and David Ormerod for many discussions of these issues. All errors and
omissions are my sole responsibility.
II will use the expression United Kingdom (U.K.). Strictly speaking, this Article will
deal only with the position in England and Wales.
2 See FRAUD TRIALS COMM., FRAUD TRIALS COMMITTEE REPORT 5 (1986).
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rational argument but by the force of international obligations, which, although
only enshrined in unjusticiable "soft law" proved sufficient to compel action.
Having dealt with the history, the Article will turn to two distinct
contemporary issues in bribery law, both of which connect the United Kingdom
with the United States. The first is the introduction of the corporate offence of
failing to prevent an employee from bribing someone, with its concomitant
defence of "adequate [corporate governance] procedures." 3 In the increasingly
globalised corporate governance environment, the effect of the introduction of
the defence will be evident, not so much in the number of prosecutions under
Section 7, but in the corporate governance regimes of the corporations to which
it applies. The shift of enforcement responsibility away from the reactive model
relying on police prosecutors and criminal courts to secure change, towards a
more proactive model enlisting the corporations themselves to make the change
will be driven partly, no doubt, by economic considerations but also partly by a
different model of criminal law enforcement which relies more upon the actions
of involved third parties.
The second issue of contemporary significance is as to agreements with
defendants. Criminal justice in England and Wales has, for many years,
operated on the expressed basis, save in narrow and clearly delineated
circumstances, that the disposition of criminal court ought not to be governed
by the agreement of the parties. 4 The history of the last twenty-five years has
been one in which it has proved very difficult to secure convictions in economic
crime trials. 5 Prosecutors have been put under pressure to produce results and
have proved vulnerable to the vagaries of criminal litigation. 6 There has
consequently been pressure, particularly as a result of policies adopted by the
most recently retired Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), to engage
more in bargaining with accused persons and corporations. 7 To move towards
bargains an additional layer is provided by the international dimension. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Convention deals with bribery across jurisdictions, and investigations are
frequently not limited to the jurisdiction in or to which the bribe is paid.8
Investigation across jurisdictions requires collaboration between national
3 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) (U.K.).
4 FRAUD TRIALS COMM., supra note 2, at 5.
5 See FRAUD TRIALS COMM., supra note 2.
6 Cf Jane Croft & Caroline Binham, 'Plea Bargain' Doubts Hit SFO Drive, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at 8 (explaining that judicial resistance to reduced sentences for
whistleblowers creates a significant barrier for prosecutors seeking information).
7 E.g., id.
8 See generally, e.g., R v. BAE Systems PLC, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 16, available
at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/r-v-bae-sentencing-
remarks.pdf; R v. Innospec Ltd., [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 7, available at http://www.
judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sentencing-remarks-thomas-Ij-
innospec.pdf.
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prosecuting authorities. Where prosecutors from one jurisdiction are used to
making agreements and the others not, this can give rise to difficulties, as were
witnessed in the cases on Innospec and BAE Systems, in which the Serious
Fraud Office had to work with the Department of Justice, and where their
efforts were not fully appreciated by the judges of England and Wales. 9
II. RECENT HISTORY
Until the late 1990s U.K. bribery law was a neglected backwater. It was
made up of common law offences 10 and groups of specific 1 or more general' 2
statutory offences. There were few prosecutions (fewer than ten per year) and
easily available charging alternatives, 13 so there was little pressure for change.
In general, for the most frequently charged statutory offences, the test the
prosecution had to satisfy was that the bribe had been given or received
"corruptly." 14 Although there were different possible meanings, usually defined
negatively ("[C]orruptly" we were told, is not the same as "dishonestly."1 5), this
9 BAE Systems, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 16 at [5]; Innospec, [2010] EW Misc
(Crown) 7 at [27], [43].
10 For example, bribery, see LAW COMM'N, REFORMING BRIBERY, 2008, H.C. 928,
paras. 2.4 2.8 (U.K.), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp185
Reforming Bribery report.pdf (enticing a public officer to act contrary to his/her duty, or to
carry out his/her duty in a biased way); blackmail, see Theft Act 1968, c. 60, § 21 (Eng. &
Wales), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/pdfs/ukpga 196800
60 en.pdf (until 1968, called extortion ex virtute officii); misfeasance in public office, see
Misconduct in Public Office, LAW COMMISSION, http://lawcommission.justice.gov.ul/areas/
misconduct.htm; conspiracy to defraud and embracery, see Bribery Act 2010, c. 23,
§ 17(1)(a) (U.K.) (bribing jurors, which was formally abolished by the Bribery Act 2010).
11 See, e.g., Sale of Offices Act 1551, 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16 (Eng. & Wales), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw6/5-6/16 (Justices of the Peace); Sale of Offices Act
1809, 49 Geo. 3, c. 126 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1809/126
/pdfs/ukpga 18090126 en.pdf (general provision, the trigger being military commissions);
Representation of the People Act 1983, c. 2, § 113 (U.K.), available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/pdfs/ukpga 19830002_en.pdf (voters); Honours
(Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 72 (U.K.), available at http:/www.
legislation.gov.ulr ukpga/1925/72/pdfs/ukpga 19250072 en.pdf (peerages and other
honours, in light of Lloyd George's activities). These offences also include those against
administration ofj ustice (bribing jurors, etc.).
12Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 69 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1889/69/pdfs/ukpga 18890069 en.pdf; Prevention of
Corruption Act 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 34 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1 906/34/pdfs/ukpga 19060034 en.pdf; Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, 6 & 7
Geo. 5, c. 64 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1916/64/pdfs/ukpga
19160064 en.pdf.
13 Most cases of bribery were also conspiracies to defraud.
14public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 69, § 1, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1889/69/pdfs/ukpga 18890069 en.pdf.
15 Cooper v. Slade, (1858) 10 Eng. Rep. 1488 (H.L.) 1499 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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was a word juries were assumed to understand. 16 When the statutory bribery
offence was charged, the "presumption of corruption" operated to place on a
public-sector recipient of largesse the burden of proving that it was not given or
taken corruptly.17 In the substantive and procedural English law of bribery, far
more significant developments have taken place in the last five years than all its
previous history. The changes we have seen have been driven by developments
worldwide, starting with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
Globalisation, including liberalisation of markets and greater ease of
communication, has made all the difference. It is not the ethical approach of the
Carter administration but the demands of fair competition in global markets that
have tugged bribery law out of obscurity into the mainstream of worldwide
legal attention. The type of corruption that triggers this change influences the
types of corruption which form the target of the law. The model for corruption
under legislation outlawing bribery is the single transaction involving
synchronous exchange of benefits. ' 8 The three main forms of corruption which
have never, without more, been criminal in English law are the linked ones of
nepotism, asynchronous exchanges, and unreciprocated but corrupt doing of
favours. 19 This is not a trivial point. Much of the recent activity in the arena has
dealt with large payments in respect of single contracts.20 It is clear that some of
the most corrupt societies are those in which the typical forms of corruption are
those which are not covered by English Law. A criminal organisation does not
need to bribe someone it already owns. The Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index,21 for example, needs to be assessed against this
consideration. Most obviously, the requirement for a bribe (rather than just the
corrupt conferment of an advantage) is both an evidential and due process
limitation upon the scope of corruption law (restricting the range of cases in
which proceedings might follow, and possibly limiting abuses by prosecutors)
and also an ethical statement, embodying the dubious precept that corruptly to
confer an advantage is acceptable if nothing is obtained in exchange. Of course
it is not.
From the election of the Blair government in May 1997, a number of factors
argued for the reform of U.K. bribery law. First, the existing law was old.
Second, the government had come to power against a background of "sleaze" in
16R v. Wellburn, (1979) 69 Crim. App. 254 at 265 (Eng. & Wales).
17 Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 64, § 2 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1916/64/pdfs/ukpga 19160064 en.pdf.
18 See supra note 12; see also infra note 20 and accompanying text.
19 This follows from the definitions of the common law offence and those in the
Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 1916. See supra notes 12, 14. This proposition is
unaltered by the Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).20 The AI-Yamamah transaction being a prime example. See infra Part V.
21 For the most recent Corruption Perception Index, see Corruption Perceptions Index
2011, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/cpi20l /results (last visited Aug.
29, 2012).
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the previous administration, and, following the "cash for questions" scandal, 22
something had to be done about the position of Member of Parliament, which
had been held to fall outside the categories of public official for the purposes of
the common law offence and outside that of "agent" for the purposes of the
statutory one.23 Third, it was said that the law was unclear-too much turned on
the jury's understanding of the word "corruptly." There were many instances,
corporate entertaining and "facilitation payments" among them, where the
evaluations of differing jurors might legitimately vary.2 4 In addition and
increasingly, the geographical locus became important to the meaning of the
adverb. The question that increasingly arose was whether the jury should apply
the test of what would count as having been done "corruptly" on a Clapham
omnibus or on whatever form of mass passenger transit obtained where the
advantage was conferred. 25 Fourth, could the "presumption of corruption" under
the Prevention of Corruption Act 191626 sit with the presumption of innocence
under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and
its domestic application under the Human Rights Act 1998?27 Fifth, there was
the procedural question of prosecutorial consents. There are groups of offences
the prosecution of which are thought sufficiently sensitive that they require the
consent of an official, either the Attorney-General (A-G) or the Director of
Public Prosecutions (DPP) (or, when the case falls under its aegis, the Director
of the Serious Fraud Office). 28 There is not much rhyme or reason in the
distinction between the list of offences where the consent is required of the
politician (A-G) and those where it is for the civil servant (DPP). It is far more a
22 Alan Doig, 'Cash for Questions': Parliament's Response to the Offence that Dare
Not Speak its Name, 51 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 36, 42-43, 46 (1998).2 3 A.W. Bradley, Parliamentary Privilege and the Common Law of Corruption: R v.
Greenway and Others, 24 COMMONW. L. BULL. 1317, 1318 (1998).
24 Oral Evidence Taken Before the Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill on
Tuesday 10 June 2003, 2002-3 PARL. (2003) (statement of Mr. Justice Silber), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt2002O3/jtselect/jtcorr/uc705-vii/uc70502.htm.
2 5 1d
26 That is, the rule that where the recipient was in the public sector, the burden was on
the recipient to establish that the gift, etc. was not received corruptly. Prevention of
Corruption Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 64, § 2 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/1916/64/pdfs/ukpga 19160064 en.pdf.
27Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6,
para. 2, Apr. 11, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR], available at http://www.
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT-005&CM-8&DF-09/10/201
2&CL-ENG; Human Rights Act 1998, c. 2 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.
gov.ukl/ukpga/1998/42/data.pdf. Article 6, paragraph 2 of the ECHR states: "Everyone
charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law." ECHR, supra, at art. 6, para. 2. The extent to which this is compatible with domestic
"shifted onus" provisions has been much debated. See, e.g., Sheldrake v. DPP, [2004]
UKHL 43, [2005] 1 A.C. 264 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).2 8 Consents to Prosecute, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/
a to c/consent toprosecute/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
2012] 1185
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
product of historical chance. The Attorney-General, however, is a party
politician who holds a seat in one or another House of Parliament and answers
there for the prosecution service. 29 Any decisions taken by the Attorney-
General to do with prosecutions have always been said to be free of political
considerations, and any suggestions to the contrary are taken to impugn the
honour of the officeholder. 30 As it happens, bribery was one of the offences
whose prosecution requires the consent of the Attorney-General. 3 1 If the offence
was to be extended to Members of Parliament, whether or not compliance with
the OECD Convention could be assured, then this might provide an excellent
opportunity to change that rule. Sixth, when the 1916 Act was put in place, the
public and private sectors were able fairly easily to be distinguished, and it was
straightforward to find moral justification for the presumption of corruption in
the public sector. Privatisation, regulation, and growth in outsourcing of roles
previously thought of as public sector ones have made this distinction no longer
easy to make or defend.32 Finally and seventh (and this is where we get to the
FCPA), there is the effect of global forces. The attitude of the U.K. government
to the use of bribes overseas by U.K. business people had been very tolerant.
Until 1992 at the earliest, and most probably 2000, companies were able to
deduct from their profits for the purposes of taxation bribes paid overseas. 33 In
1997 the Paris Convention of the OECD changed the landscape.
Of these, only the final one, and to the extent that it was bound up in the
final one, the fifth, were such as to compel action from an incoming government
with a full legislative agenda. 34 Arguments about old laws always have two
facets. On the one hand, the law is old, irrational, and cranky. On the other
hand, because it is old, all users have a reasonably clear idea what it means;
there is no need for "bedding in," and leaving things as they are is a way to save
Parliamentary time. So far as concerns the European Convention and especially
Article 6(2), at the time it was widely thought that there were comparatively
few offences with such "reversed onus" provisions, that public sector bribery
2 9 Statutory Duties and Powers, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, http://www.cps.gov.uk
/legal/s to u/statutory dutiesandjpowers /(last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
3 0 1d.
3 1 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 34, § 2(1) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1906/34/pdfs/ukpga 19060034 en.pdf.
32 The use of government contracts and subsidies of bodies with independent legal
personality is an example. Until the 1980s in the U.K. housing for let was either publicly
owned or owned by private landlords. The advent of housing associations with links and
obligations to government but formal independence blurred the boundary.
33 It was unclear whether or not this had been achieved by the Finance Act 1992 and
Finance Act 1993, or the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988. It was finally put beyond
argument on April 1, 2002, by the Finance Act 2002, c. 23, § 68(2) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/23/pdfs/ukpga 20020023 en.pdf.
34 The Blair (Labour) Government took office on May 1, 1997. JOSEPH E. THOMPSON,
AMERICAN POLICY AND NORTHERN IRELAND: A SAGA OF PEACEBUILDING 194 (2001). Before
that the Conservatives had held power since 1979. See id.
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was one, and that the effect to be given to Article 6(2) of the Convention by the
Human Rights Act 1998 would require legislative action.35 As matters
developed, the ECHR argument turned out not to be so serious a force for
change. 36 It was eventually held that the only way to avoid incompatibility is
for the offending provision 37 to be "read down"38 in such a way that it imposes
only an evidential burden on the defence. The Human Rights Act 1998, section
3, provides the necessary authority for such a reading down.39
III. "WE'LL ALWAYS HAVE PARIS ' '40
The origins of the Paris Convention are in the FCPA. The (U.S.) Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 placed a duty upon the President to
pursue international agreement amongst members of the OECD to create
FCPA-type legislation applying in the countries that are not members.41 The
United States used its influence to apply the same rules to everyone. In 1998 the
FCPA was strengthened by the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition
Act of 1998.42 At the prompting of the United States, the OECD put in place the
Paris Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, which was signed
in 1997 and entered force in 1999.43 This required the U.K. government to
3 5 See LAW COMM'N, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: CORRUPTION, 1998, H.C. 524,
paras. 4.1-4.4,4.76 4.78 (U.K.).
36The leading cases are Sheldrake v. DPP, [2004] UKHL 43, [2005] 1 A.C. 264
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales), and R v. Lambert, [2001] UKHL 37, [2002] 2 A.C. 545
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).37 prevention of Corruption Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 64, § 2 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 1916/64/pdfs/ukpga 19160064 en.pdf.
3 8
"Read down" is an expression in (U.K.) human rights law to indicate that the
interpretative obligation imposed by the Human Rights Act 1998-to interpret existing
statutes where possible in accordance with the convention has been applied. Human Rights
Act 1998, c. 42, § 3 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.ukl/ukpga/ 1998/42/
data.pdf. It stems from Lambert, [2001] UKHL 37 at [17], [2002] 2 A.C. at 563; see also
generally Tovey v. Ministry of Justice, [2011] EWHC (QB) 271, available at http://
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2011/271.html; Webster v. R, [2010] EWCA (Crim)
2819, available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2010/2819.html; Sheldrake,
[2004] UKHL 43, [2005] 1 A.C. 264.
39 Webster, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2819 at [30]-[31] (quoting Ghaidan v. Godin-
Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, [32] [33], [2004] 2 A.C. 557, 571 72 (appeal taken from Eng.
& Wales)).
4 0 CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. Pictures 1942).
41 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102
Stat. 1107, 1415 25 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78); see also generally Exec. Order
No. 12,661,3 C.F.R. 618 (1988).
42 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78).
43 Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Ten Years On, 5
MANCHESTER J. OF INT'L ECON. L., no. 1, 2008 at 4-7.
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instantiate legislation, and subsequently to enforce it, making it a crime for a
British citizen or company to bribe a foreign public official to secure a
contract. 44 Those responsible for the Convention were not principally concerned
about the loyalty of employees of foreign governments. They cared about
markets and whether or not their companies could compete in them on equal
terms.
45
Given the state of English law, from the time of signing the Convention, in
order minimally to comply with the requirements of the Convention, the United
Kingdom was therefore obliged:
(i) to extend the territorial scope of bribery law, at least so far as concerned
officials; and
(ii) to deal with the role of the Attorney-General in bribery prosecutions in
a manner which better respected the separation of powers. In particular,
the Attorney-General had to be taken away from decisions in respect of
prosecutions where there might be any "political" content; and
(iii)to observe of Article 5 of the Convention, which prohibited the making
of decisions based upon the economic interest of the state party; and
(iv) to move away from the use of the supposedly vague term "corruptly"
(and a jury's view of its meaning) as providing the basis for liability;
and
(v) to put in place a r6gime that would give rise to effective, proportionate,
and dissuasive sanctions not merely for individuals but also for
companies, so as to satisfy Article 2 and 3 of the Convention. 46
In order to accomplish all these tasks satisfactorily, it was necessary to deal
with a range of substantive and procedural legal questions. Of the substantive
issues, six were prominent. First, there is the "public/private" distinction. Since
the very earliest times, the law of bribery has been informed by the sentiments
that there are some jobs the holders of which should not receive anything from
sources other than their employer. 47 There are others who might be allowed to
benefit otherwise than from their employer. 4 8 Broadly speaking this division
follows roughly the "public/private" boundary. The boundary has, however,
become increasingly blurred since the Victorian and Edwardian legislation. It is
reasonably clear that if judges, prosecutors, police officers, tax, or customs and
immigration officials obtain benefits otherwise than from the employer
4 4 See id at 7 (citing Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions art. 1, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43 cmt. [hereinafter OECD
Convention]).
45 This is what the OECD is for. See Carr & Outhwaite, supra note 43, at 4.
4 6 See generally OECD Convention, supra note 44.
47See 3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
250 (1883) (quoting 8 Rich. 2, c. 3 (1384) (Eng.)).
48 An obvious example is those occupations that may attract gratuities.
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something needs to be explained. 4 9 What of people working in housing
associations, or even universities? This needed to be considered afresh. Second,
there was the question of the mental state. English law had adopted as the test
for liability the flexible term "corruptly. "50 This was a mechanism by which to
allow juries to differentiate between those advantages, secured by people in the
appropriate relationships acceptance of which was criminal, and those which
were not. Third, if there was to be a departure from the use of "corruptly,"
which covered a range of issues, not simply of mental states, then those issues
would have to be dealt with otherwise than by mental states. These include the
difficult questions surrounding "normal business practice" and business
entertaining, and the possibility of a defence of de minimis. 5 1 Fourth, the
national security exception had to be addressed. One of the methods of the
security services when working abroad is to bribe local officials. 52 The decision
to bring the security services under a legal framework raises questions as to how
this particular area of their work is dealt with. Fifth, there are local agents.
Under the OECD Convention as introduced, there was a loophole for wholly
owned local subsidiaries through which bribes were passed. 53 This needed to be
plugged. Sixth, there was the question of "facilitation payments." It was
generally perceived to be a problem under the FCPA that facilitation payments
were not covered and that they should be, perhaps with an explicit and
controlled prosecutorial discretion not to proceed in trivial cases. 54
There were also two procedural issues to be dealt with. First, if Members of
Parliament were to be brought within the ambit of the law, in particular taking
payments to ask Parliamentary Questions or even to move motions, then, it was
argued, something had to be done to deal with the relations between the courts
4 9 R v. Wellburn, (1979) 69 Crim. App. 254 at 265 (Eng. & Wales).50 See Cooper v. Slade, (1858) 10 Eng. Rep. 1488 (H.L.) 1499 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
5 1 See generally LAW COMM'N, REFORMING BRIBERY, 2008, H.C. 928 (U.K.)
[hereinafter LAW COMM'N, REFORMING BRIBERY], available at http://lawcommission.justice.
gov.uk/docs/1c313_Reforming Bribery.pdf; LAW COMM'N, REFORMING BRIBERY: A
CONSULTATION PAPER, No. 185 (2007) (U.K.) [hereinafter LAW COMM'N CONSULTATION
PAPER 185], available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp]85 Reforming_
Bribery consultation.pdf; LAW COMM'N, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: CORRUPTION,
1998, H.C. 524 (U.K.) [hereinafter LAW COMM'N, CORRUPTION], available at http:/
lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc248 Legislating the Criminal Code Corruption.pdf;
LAW COMM'N, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: CORRUPTION: A CONSULTATION PAPER,
No. 145 (1997) (U.K.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/other/EWLC/1997 /c145.pdf.
5 2 See Jeremy Horder, On Her Majesty's Commercial Service: Bribery, Public Officials
and the UK Intelligence Services, 74 M.L.R. 911, 911 12, 918 19 (2011).
5 3 THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY 129-36 (Mark Pieth,
Lucinda A. Low & Peter J. Cullen eds., 2007).
54 See Jon Jordan, The OECD's Call for an End to "Corrosive" Facilitation Payments
and the International Focus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 881, 896-98 (2011).
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and Parliament and the admissibility of Hansard (the Parliamentary record) in
evidence. 55 There were those who asserted that some amendment would be
necessary to the Parliamentary privilege provision of the Bill of Rights 1689.56
Second, consents to prosecutions would have to be taken out of the hands of the
Attorney-General. 57
IV. THE REFORM SAGA
The then (Blair) government used the events of September 2001 to apply a
sticking plaster to the law of bribery. In the legislation passed immediately upon
the attacks on the United States, it amended the territorial scope of the law of
bribery, supposedly to go some way towards bringing the law into compliance
with the OECD Convention. 58 At the time, it also made clear that the 2001 Act
was not intended to be a substitute for thoroughgoing reform. 59 There followed
a series of attempts at law reform which are extraordinary in the level of
attention given over a sustained period to a relatively small area of law and the
range of options canvassed. 60 In 2003, following recommendations from the
Law Commission, the Government introduced a draft Corruption Bill, for
consideration by a Joint Parliamentary Committee. 6 1 The Bill was based largely
5 5 JOINT COMM. ON DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL, DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL: REPORT AND
EVIDENCE, 2002-3, H.C. 705, H.L. Paper 157, paras. 107, 118 (U.K.) [hereinafter DRAFT
CORRUPTION BILL], available at http://www.publications.parliament.ulk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/
jtcorr/157/157.pdf.56 Bill of Rights 1688, 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (Eng. & Wales). This was much discussed in
the DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL, supra note 55, at paras. 101 29.
5 7 DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL, supra note 55, at paras. 136 39.
5 8 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24, §§ 108 10 (U.K.).
59 629 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2001) 287-89 (U.K.).
6 0 See generally, e.g., HOME OFFICE, CORRUPTION: DRAFT LEGISLATION, 2003, Cm.
5777 (U.K.) [hereinafter HOME OFFICE, DRAFT CORRUPTION LEGISLATION], available at
http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm57/5777/5777.pdf, DRAFT
CORRUPTION BILL, supra note 55; SEC'Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP'T, DRAFT
CORRUPTION BILL: THE GOVERNMENT REPLY TO THE REPORT FROM THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL SESSION 2002-03 HL PAPER 157, HC 705, 2003, Cm. 6086
(U.K.) [hereinafter HOME SEC'Y, GOVERNMENT REPLY], available at http://www.archive2.
official-documents.co.ul/document/cm6O/6086/6086.pdf; HOME OFFICE, BRIBERY: REFORM
OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACTS AND SFO POWERS IN CASES OF BRIBERY OF
FOREIGN OFFICIALS: A CONSULTATION PAPER (2005) (U.K.) [hereinafter HOME OFFICE,
BRIBERY CONSULTATION PAPER], available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/bribery consultation
paper.pdf; LAW COMM'N CONSULTATION PAPER 185, supra note 51; LAW COMM'N,
REFORMING BRIBERY, supra note 51; JOINT COMM. ON THE DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, DRAFT
BRIBERY BILL: FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 2008-09, 2008-9, H.L. 115-I, H.C. 430-1 (U.K.)
[hereinafter DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, vol. 1], available at http://www.publications.parliament.
ul/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtbribe/ 11511 5i.pdf.
61 See generally HOME OFFICE, DRAFT CORRUPTION LEGISLATION, supra note 60. The
purpose of the procedure of submitting a draft Bill to a Parliamentary Committee for
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upon the Law Commission's 1998 Report. 62 The Bill followed the previous
legislation and relied upon the principal-agent nexus as providing the legal
precondition to bribery. 63 This constituted the "principal" (widely understood,
usually the employer) as the "victim" of bribery. 64 The view that the principal
was a victim, combined with the general precept 65 that in all but the most
serious offences against the person, the consent of the victim was a complete
defence to a criminal charge, was the blind alley down which the law went.6 6
Consequently, the Law Commission's draft Bill had included a consent
defence. 67 The Joint Parliamentary Committee considering the Bill was chaired
by Lord Slynn of Hadley. 68 The Draft Bill procedure is one established to
enable a Parliamentary Committee to consider a range of possible solutions to a
problem, rather than being constrained by the stark options of rejecting the Bill
outright (at Second Reading) or making textual amendments (at Committee
stage). 69
Various aspects of the Bill were subject to scrutiny. In particular, a great
deal of time was spent on the proposal to amend the Parliamentary privilege
provisions of the Bill of Rights 1689, only so far as concerned the new proposed
bribery offence, and the continued concentration of the law upon the principal-
agent nexus.70 As to the OECD Convention, the Committee heard evidence
from Mark Pieth, the widely influential chair of the OECD working Group on
Bribery.7 1
In its report, the Joint Committee gave only a qualified assent to the Bill.72
So far as concerned the principal-agent nexus, Lord Slynn told the House of
Lords that:
scrutiny is to avoid the stark choice between opposition tout court, typically at Second
Reading, and textual amendment, neither of which allow Parliamentarians the scope to
explore alternative solutions to one proposed in a substantive Bill. See Draft Bills,
WWW.PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.ukl/about/how/laws/draft/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2012).
62 See generally LAW COMM'N, CORRUPTION, supra note 51.
6 3 Peter Alldridge, Reforming Bribery: Lmav Commission Consultation Paper 185(1)
Bribery Reform and the Law Commission Again, 2008 Crim. L. Rev. 671, 671 89.
64 663 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1549 (U.K.).
65 At that time there was still a project for a Criminal Code embodying (much debated)
general principles. The project was subsequently abandoned. LAW COMM'N, TENTH
PROGRAMME OF LAW REFORM, 2008, H.C. 605, para. 3.3 (U.K.), available at http:/
lawcommission.justice.gov.ulr docs/lc3 11 10th Programme.pdf.
66R v. Brown, [1994] 1 A.C. 212 (H.L.) 213 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales) lays
down some limitations that are not relevant here.
6 7 HOME OFFICE, DRAFT CORRUPTION LEGISLATION, supra note 60, at para. 7.
6 8 See generally DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL, supra note 55.
69Draft Bills, supra note 61.
70See generally DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL, supra note 55.
7 1 d. at 69 71, 98.
72 663 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1549 (U.K.).
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The committee states, with conviction, that the agent/principal test is not the
appropriate one. We invite the Home Secretary perhaps to step back from the
Bill and to reconsider how a criminal offence can be defined which is wide
enough, meeting the essentials of corruption and in language which is
intelligible rather than to hold on so resolutely to the agent/principal test.73
The Committee's report included an annex setting out what an alternative
version of the crime of bribery might look like if, instead of from the principal-
agent nexus the crime had been derived, as in many cases, from notions of
competition. 74 The government published a holding response. 75. it might have
been possible to proceed with that Bill, but the reception was later described by
Lord Goldsmith thus: "[W]hen the Bill was produced, it was heavily criticised
by the Joint Committee that gave it its pre-legislative scrutiny. The Joint
Committee recommended an entirely different basis for the scheme of offences,
which the Government then found unworkable." 76
In July 2004, the OECD conducted its second site visit to the United
Kingdom.77 Site visits and subsequent recommendations under the aegis of the
Working Group on Bribery are the principal mechanism whereby the "soft law"
obligations set out in the Convention are enforced.7 8 The procedure is that the
delegation from two other OECD nations-in the case of the United Kingdom,
from France and Canada-takes evidence in writing and by interviewing
witnesses, including police, prosecutors, legal practitioners, and academic
experts. 79 At this time, the Draft Bill had only recently been "approved" by the
Joint Committee.8" The OECD delegation was keen to see legislative progress,
but at that point their patience was not yet exhausted. In 2005 the Home Office
published a further consultation paper, displaying rather less urgency. 81
7 3 1d. at 1553.
7 4 DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL, supra note 55, at 80 84 (including note by Peter
Alldridge, specialist adviser, on locating the harm in bribery and corruption-an alternative
approach).7 5 See generally HOME SEC'Y, GOVERNMENT REPLY, supra note 60.
76 690 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2007) 962 (U.K.).
7 7 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2: REPORT ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON
COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, paras. 1 2 (Mar. 17,
2005) [hereinafter OECD PHASE 2], available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/
briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/34599062.pdf.
7 8 See generally OECD Convention, supra note 44.7 9 THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY 459 62 (Mark Pieth,
Lucinda A. Low & Peter J. Cullen eds., 2007).
80 See generally HOME SEC'Y, GOVERNMENT REPLY, supra note 60.
81 See generally HOME OFFICE, BRIBERY CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 60.
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V. AL-YAMAMAH
Although the full extent of the deal has never been fully clarified, the Al-
Yamamah arms deal (really a series of deals dating from the 1980s) was
described as "the biggest sale ever, of anything, to anyone," "staggering both by
its sheer size" and complexity.8 2 There were, from the outset, allegations that
the contracts were a result of bribes to members of the Saudi royal family and
government officials. 83 The Serious Fraud Office was reported to be
considering opening an investigation into an alleged £20 million slush fund.
8 4
In October 2004, the BBC's Money Programme broadcast an in-depth story,
including allegations in interviews with Edward Cunningham and other former
insiders, about the way BAE Systems allegedly paid bribes to Prince Turki bin
Nasser and ran a secret £60 million slush fund in relation to the AI-Yamamah
deal.8 5 Most of the money was alleged to have been spent through a front
company called Robert Lee International Limited. 86 In June 2007 the BBC's
investigative programme Panorama alleged that BAE Systems "paid hundreds
of millions of pounds to the ex-Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin
Sultan." 87
In late 2005, BAE refused to comply with compulsory production notices
for details of its secret offshore payments to the Middle East.8 8 The terms of the
investigation referred to a prosecution under Part 12 of the Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001.89 At the end of November 2006, when the long-
82 David White & Robert Mauthner, Britain's Arms Sale of the Century, FIN. TIMES,
July 9, 1988, at 7.8 3 See, e.g., David Leigh, Rob Evans & David Gow, Fraud Office Looks Again at BAE:
SFO Considers Inquiry into BAE Slush Fund Claims, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2003, 9:52 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/sep/12/freedomofinformation.saudiarabia/print.84 1d
85 Michael Robinson, BBC Lifts the Lid on Secret BAE Slush Fund, BBC NEWS (Oct. 5,
2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/3712770.stm.
86David Leigh & Rob Evans, Arms Firm's £60M Slush Fund, GUARDIAN (May 4,
2004, 4:34 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/may/04/politics.saudiarabia/print.
87 Saudi Prince 'Received Arms Cash', BBC NEWS (June 7, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/6728773.stm.
88David Leigh & Rob Evans, Parliamentary Auditor Hampers Police Inquiry into
Arms Deal, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jul/25/houseof
commons.armstrade.
89 This may not have been correct. The offences were alleged to have been committed
in the 1980s. The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act came into force in February 2002.
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Commencement No. 3) Order 2002, 2002,
S.I. 228 (Eng., Wales, & N. Ir.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/228/
pdfs/uksi_20020228_en.pdf. The jurisdictional basis would have been the common law of
criminal jurisdiction. See R v. Smith, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 631, [47], [64] [66], [2004]
Q.B. 1418, 1431, 1437-39 (overruling R v. Manning, [1999] Q.B. 980 (Eng.)). This
distinction would have been significant because the presumption of corruption, under
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 64, § 2 (U.K.), available at
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running investigation was threatening to go on for two more years, BAE
Systems was negotiating a multi-billion pound sale of Eurofighter Typhoons to
Saudi Arabia. 90 Significant numbers of jobs were at stake. 9 1 On December 1,
2006, the Daily Telegraph ran a front page headline suggesting that Saudi
Arabia had given the United Kingdom ten days to suspend the Serious Fraud
Office investigation into BAE/Saudi Arabian transactions, failing which it
would take the deal to France. 92 This threat was played down in other quarters.
Robert Wardle, head of the SFO, also stated (in a later High Court challenge)
that at that time he had received a direct threat of a cessation of counterterrorist
cooperation from the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United Kingdom in the
first of three meetings held to assess the seriousness of the threat.93 Wardle was
left with the clear impression that "British lives on British streets were at
risk." 94
After the matter had gone to the then Attorney-General and Prime Minister
(Lord Goldsmith and Tony Blair, respectively) on December 13, 2006, the
Director of the SFO wrote to the Attorney-General to inform him that the SFO
was dropping the investigation and would not be looking into the Swiss bank
accounts, stating that its continuation risked "real and imminent damage to the
U.K.'s national and international security and would endanger the lives of U.K.
citizens and service personnel." 95 Lord Goldsmith QC defended the decision to
end the enquiry in a short Parliamentary statement:
The Director of the Serious Fraud Office has decided to discontinue the
investigation into the affairs of [BAE Systems PLC] as far as they relate to the
Al Yamamah defence contract. This decision has been taken following
representations that have been made both to the Attorney General and the
Director concerning the need to safeguard national and international security. It
has been necessary to balance the need to maintain the rule of law against the
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1916/64/pdfs/ukpga 19160064 en.pdf, was removed
by § 110 of the 2001 Act only so far as concerned prosecutions made possible by the
statutorily extended jurisdiction. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24, § 110
(U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uklukpga/2001/24/pdfs/ukpga 20010024
en.pdf.
9 0 Grand Salaam! Eurofighter Flies Qff with Saudi Contract, DEF. INDUSTRY DAILY
(Apr. 8, 2012, 3:32 PM), http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-2006-saudi-shopping-
spree-eurofighter-flying-off-with- I 0b-saudi-contract-updated-0 1669/.
91 Christopher Hope, Halt Inquiry or We Cancel Eurofighters, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 1,
2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1535683/Halt-inquiry-or-we-
cancel-Eurofighters.html. See also BAE Admits Saudi Eurofighter Fear, BBC NEWS (Nov.
28, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6190998.stm.
92 Hope, supra note 92.
93 R v. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 714, [83]-[87], [2009]
1 A.C. 756, 785.94 R v. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] UKHL 60, [14], [2009] 1 A.C. 756, 835
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).9 5 Dir. of the SFO, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 714 at [36], [2009] 1 A.C. at 775.
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wider public interest. No weight has been given to commercial interests or to
the national economic interest. 96
Lord Goldsmith's principal objective in Parliament seems to have been to
forestall any claim that the Government had acted in breach of Article 5 of the
OECD Convention by making a decision based upon the economic interest of
the United Kingdom. 97 In a contemporaneous interview with the Financial
Times, however, he was more forthcoming and stated that the principal's
consent was the major obstacle to the prosecution:
AG. [ ... ] I very carefully considered this case. I talked it through over a
matter of days with the SFO investigators and their lawyers. I had independent
legal advice from a senior experienced criminal QC. My judgement was that
this case at the end of the day wouldn't have led to a successful prosecution.
INTERVIEWER. Can I just take you back...
AG. Let me just finish the point here. I just want to make this clear
because I know the SFO have said something different. I entirely respect the
SFO. They recognise they weren't going to prosecute for anything pre-2002. A
lot of the stuff that's been in the newspapers and the comment has been about
"this payment has been made here, that payment has been made there". People
saying, "what about this invoice and that invoice?" It's all pre-2002.
The SFO accepted that they wouldn't prosecute in relation to pre-2002
because that's when we changed the law. They said they would need another
18 months to investigate. They were clear that there remained, as they put it,
issues to determine. My judgement was there were obstacles they would not
overcome.
INTERVIEWER. What were those obstacles?
AG. The principal obstacle, BAE were asserting that the payments they
were making had been authorised at the highest level.
INTERVIEWER. The highest level of the Saudi monarchy?
AG. Yes, the Saudis. I am using that in a general sense ... [pauses] ...
Normally to produce a corruption case you normally will call somebody senior
from the company to say, "good heavens, I never knew the marketing director
was taking used £50 notes, or getting a free subscription to the golf club, or
having his roof done", or whatever it may be. That's the first person you call.
How were the SFO going to deal with that in this case? Were they going to be
96 687 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 1711 12 (U.K.) (citing Press Release, Serious
Fraud Office, BAE Systems Plc/Saudi Arabia (Dec. 14, 2006)), available at http://
www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2006/bae-systems-plcsaudi-
arabia.aspx).9 7 OECD Convention, supra note 44, at art. 5. Article 5 states:
Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public official shall be
subject to the applicable rules and principles of each Party. They shall not be influenced
by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with
another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons involved.
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able to call someone from Saudi to say this wasn't authorised? That's an
insuperable problem. 98
That is, in 2007 Lord Goldsmith argued, as had the Law Commission and
the 2003 Draft Bill, that the consent of the principal was a defence to a charge
of bribery. 99 So far as concerned the AI-Yamamah deal, that implied that, had
someone within the Saudi government (the King?) consented to Prince Bandar
accepting the money, there would have been no offence. In fact, that had never
been the law. When the Prevention of Corruption Acts were put in place, it had
not been contemplated remotely that consent could provide a defence.
Analytical wires had become crossed in the late 1990s between those who
wanted a criminal code covering all crimes with general defences, including a
general defence of consent of the "victim," and those who saw the principal-
agent relationship as a necessary precondition to bribery and the crime of
bribery as an attack on that relationship, and this provided Lord Goldsmith with
a colourable justification for the decision. A subsequent attempt to secure
judicial review of the decision to cease the investigation failed.100 In 2010, BAE
Systems Plc pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to conspiring to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding
its lawful functions, to making false statements about its Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act compliance program, and to violating the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).10I
In April 2008 the OECD conducted a further site visit (the Phase 2bis
examination). 10 2 This occurred in the wake of the Al-Yamamah decision. By
9 8 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2BIs: REPORT ON
THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION
ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, para. 38 (Oct. 16,
2008) [hereinafter OECD, PHASE 2BIS] (alteration in original) (quoting a January 2007
interview of the Attorney-General), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/
briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/41515077.pdf.
9 9 1d.
100 See R v. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] UKHL 60, [83] [87], [2009] 1 A.C.
756, 784-85 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales), in which the House of Lords expressed
strong sympathy with Wardle's position. See also Roman Tomasic, The Financial Crisis and
the Haphazard Pursuit of Financial Crime, 18 J. FIN. CRIME 7, 10 (2011).
101 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered
to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2010/ March/ 10-crm-209.html.
102 OECD, PHASE 2BIS, supra note 98, at 4.
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this stage, the OECD had lost patience with the United Kingdom completely.
The tone of the questioning was far more aggressive than in 2004, and the
ensuing report was seriously condemnatory. 10 3 One of the matters upon which
the questioning concentrated was the Attorney-General's statement made to the
Financial Times and the question whether, as Lord Goldsmith seemed to have
claimed, consent of the principal could constitute a defence to a charge of
bribery in the AI-Yamamah case. The relevant part of the OECD report is as
follows:
At the on-site visit, several panellists disagreed with this view and did not
see principal consent as a valid defence. As noted in the UK's submissions
quoted above, the principal consent defence arises only for an offence under
the 1906 Act. Offences under the common law and the 1889 Act (as amended)
do not rely on the agent/principal concept and should thus be unaffected by
principal consent. But regardless of the defence's status or scope in UK law,
the AI-Yamamah case shows that principal consent at a minimum interferes
with the investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery cases in practice. 10 4
The U.K. government finally saw that something needed to be done as a
matter of urgency. The Law Commission had already assembled in March 2007
a Bribery Advisory Group, and it then produced a consultation paper (which
adhered to its previous position that bribery is a crime against loyalty). 10 5 That
paper included an appendix which was a response to the position that had been
outlined in the paper appended to the Report of the Slynn Committee. 10 6 The
burden of the Commission's response was that there were many offences that
covered anticompetitive behaviour and that bribery ought not to be conceived as
a further one. 107 The Commission therefore recommended a version of the
bribery offence that turned upon the existence, among other things, of prior
legal duties (to act impartially, to act in good faith, or to be in a position of
trust).10 8 The obvious objection to this proposal was that some of those duties
could only be found in contracts, usually contracts of employment; since the
duties were set out in contracts, they could be altered or removed by contracts;
and where they were altered or removed by contracts, this would have the effect
of creating a defence of the consent of the principal, which would have meant in
turn that the proposed legislation would not have been compliant to the
1031d. at para. 79. ("The examining team... consider[s] that there is a lack of political
will to achieve compliance with the Convention.").
10 4 1d. at para. 39.
105 LAW COMM'N CONSULTATION PAPER 185, supra note 51, at para. 4.5(4).
10 6 1d. at paras. D.1 D.65 (Appendix D: The Harm of Bribery: Individual or Market-
Based).
1071d. at para. 11.79.
10 8 Id. at paras. 5.47-5.49.
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Convention. This objection was made and taken. 10 9 The Law Commission then
made substantial changes to the proposal floated in the Consultation Paper. I10 In
particular, the Commission accepted (finally, but not expressly) that bribery is a
crime directed against anticompetitive behaviour and replaced the idea of
"duty" with one of reasonable expectation, thereby avoiding the problem, at the
expense of a certain extra complication of the terms of the contract of
employment. 1
In 2009 the Government introduced a further bill, along the lines proposed
by the Law Commission. 112 Probably mistakenly, it was introduced again under
the Draft Bill procedure. Since by the time there was no real chance of
amendments other than textual ones being suggested, it could have been
introduced as a regular bill. On this occasion the principal questions arising
surrounded the introduction of a specific offence to deal with the bribery of
overseas public officials (Section 6) and the consequences of the offence,
designed to bring companies within the scope of the Act by making companies
vicariously liable for the actions of their employees in bribing, unless they can
establish that they had in place appropriate procedures to prevent bribery by
their employees. 113 Consent to prosecutions was now in the hands of the
relevant directors (usually the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Director of
the Serious Fraud Office, not the Attorney-General). 114 The Draft Bill, a far
better one than the 2003 one, was endorsed in all major facets. A full bill was
then introduced and was enacted in the last days of the Blair government. 115
VI. THE BRIBERY ACT 2010116
The Bribery Act 2010 contains new substantive offences of active and
passive bribery, defined no longer by reference to the adverb "corruptly" but by
intention to affect the way in which somebody acts who is expected to act in
good faith or impartially or who is in a position of trust.117 It contains no
'
09 Alldridge, Reforming Bribery, supra note 62, at 671 89; see also LAW COMM'N,
REFORMING BRIBERY, supra note 51, at para. 3.91.
10 See generally LAW COMM'N, REFORMING BRIBERY, supra note 51.
111Id. at para. 3.88.
112DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, Vol. 1, supra note 60, at para. 12.
1131d.
141d. at para. 165.
115 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
l6 For a recent direct comparison with the FCPA, see generally Nicholas Cropp, The
Bribery Act 2010: (4) A Comparison with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Nuance v
ANous, 2011 CRIM. L. REV. 122.
117There are full commentaries upon the Act in Issue 2 of Criminal Law Review 2011, a
special issue dedicated to the new Bribery Act 2010. See also generally, in due course,
Modern Bribery Law (Jeremy Horder & Peter Alldridge eds.) (Aug. 23, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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explicit public/private distinction.1 18 The Act put in place a specific overseas
bribery offence' 19 to deal with overseas officials and a further new offence
committed by corporations employing persons who bribe unless they have
adequate procedures in place. 120 It involves an extended jurisdiction. 12 1 Consent
to prosecution is for the relevant director. 12 2 Shortly after it came into force, the
Bribery Act was described in a blog as "the ballyhooed U.K. Bribery Act, the
caffeinated younger sibling of the FCPA."' 123
So far as concerned the immediate general objective of compliance with the
Convention, the site visit in November 2011, at which the mood was
significantly improved from the 2008 site visit, led to a report, which, by giving
the United Kingdom a clean bill of health, clearly regarded the United Kingdom
as part of the international effort to combat international corruption. 124 Some
major remaining deficiencies were emphasised. They were the resourcing of the
SFO, and the difficulties and the use of confidentiality clauses in agreements-
usually agreements concerning a civil recovery order. 125 Clarification was also
sought on the significance of "reasonable and proportionate" hospitality and
promotional expenditures and the distinction between provision of advice and
self-reports. 126 So far as concerns the United Kingdom, this was an entirely
satisfactory outcome. The remainder of this Article will involve an exploration
of some of the "adequate procedures" defences introduced by the Act and, then,
issues relating to enforcement.
VII. CORPORATE LIABILITY AND THE SECTION 7 OFFENCE
Under the OECD Convention, the U.K. government is obliged to put in
place a regime on the bribery of overseas officials that gives rise to liability for
18 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, §§ 1-2 (U.K.).
1191d. § 6.
1201d. § 7.
121Id § 12.
122 Either the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Director of the Serious Fraud
Office. Id. § 10.
123 Joe Palazzolo, Law Blog Job of Week: SFO Director, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Oct. 25,
2011, 1:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/25/law-blog-job-of-week-sfo-director/.
And some of the ballyhoo has been seen in the U.S. journals. See generally, e.g., F. Joseph
Warin, Charles Falconer & Michael S. Diamant, The British Are Coming.: Britain Changes
Its Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight Against Corruption, 46 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 1 (2010).
124ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 5 (Mar. 16, 2012) [hereinafter
OECD, PHASE 3], available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternational
business/anti-briberyconvention/50026751 .pdf.
12 5 id.
126 Id
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corporations, and that liability must be more than a theoretical possibility. 127
Corporations must be subject to "effective, proportionate and dissuasive
criminal penalties."' 128 Even after the enactment of the Bribery Act 2010,
compliance with the Convention could not be assured solely by relying on the
standard English law doctrine that corporations are subject to criminal liability.
It would not have been plausible to argue that the existence of new bribery
offences under sections 1, 2, and 6 of the Bribery Act 2010, applying, as they
do, to corporations, without more, satisfies the requirement of the Convention to
have in place "effective, proportionate and dissuasive noncriminal
sanctions." 12 9 The respondeat superior doctrine does not apply in English
criminal law. The alternative and much narrower "identification doctrine"
makes the conviction of a company dependent upon it being able to be
established by the prosecution that there was a single person, high up within the
organisation, that could be convicted of the crime.1 30 The effect of the
identification doctrine has been that prosecutions against companies face
significant and frequently insuperable obstacles.
Since 2008, three individuals (Dougall, Tobiasen, and Messent) 13 1 and two
companies (Innospec and Mabey & Johnson) 132 have been convicted of foreign
bribery. Two financial institutions (Aon and Willis) have been fined by their
regulator for failure to adopt adequate corporate compliance measures to
12 7 OECD Convention, supra note 44, at art. 1, para. 1.
1281d. at art. 3, para. 1.
12 9 1d. at art. 3, para. 2.
130 See Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153 (H.L.) 174 75 (appeal
taken from Eng. & Wales); see also, e.g., Celia Wells, Corporate Criminal Liability in
England and Wales. Past, Present, and Future, in CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 91, 104
(Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory eds., 2011). A recent example of the application of this doctrine
is R v. St. Regis Paper Co., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2527, [30], [2012] P.T.S.R. 871 [883].
The identification doctrine is the reason for the perceived necessity for the enactment of the
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, c. 19 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/19/pdfs/ukpga 20070019 en.pdf.
13 1 R v. Dougall, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1048, [26], available at http://www.bailii.org/
ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2010/1048.html; Rob Evans & Paul Lewis, First Executive Convicted
of Foreign Bribery Escapes Jail Term, GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/27/uganda.ukcrime; Press Release, Serious
Fraud Office, Insurance Broker Jailed for Bribing Costa Rican Officials (Oct. 26, 2010),
available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-
2010/insurance-broker-jailed-for-bribing-costa-rican-officials.aspx.
132 See generally R v. Innospec Ltd., [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 7, available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sentencing-remarks-
thomas-lj-innospec.pdf.; David Leigh & Rob Evans, British Firm Mabey and Johnson
Convicted of Bribing Foreign Politicians, GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2009, 12:50 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/sep/25/mabey-johnson-foreign-bribery.
1200 [Vol. 73:5
THE U.K. BRIBERY ACT
prevent bribery. 133 Foreign bribery investigations have led to sanctions against
one company (BAE) for accounting-related misconduct,134 and to civil recovery
orders under proceeds of crime legislation against four companies (Balfour
Beatty, DePuy International, Ltd., M.W. Kellogg, and Macmillan). 135
The impediments in the law of corporate criminal liability meant that
simply to enact the new bribery offences (that is, those under sections 1, 2, and
6 of Bribery Act 2010) would still have left the United Kingdom significantly
short of complying with the Paris Convention. In order to comply with Articles
2 and 3, the United Kingdom had to do something to deal effectively with
corporations bribing abroad. Driven by a rather belated keenness to comply
with international obligations, arising in particular from the adverse
international response to the AI-Yamamah affair, the Bribery Act 2010 put in
place the following offence:
7 Failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery
(1) A relevant commercial organisation ("C") is guilty of an offence
under this section if a person ("A") associated with C bribes another
person intending-
(a) to obtain or retain business for C, or
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business
for C.
(2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate
procedures designed to prevent persons associated with C from
undertaking such conduct.
(3) For the purposes of this section, A bribes another person if, and only
if, A-
(a) is, or would be, guilty of an offence under section 1 or 6
(whether or not A has been prosecuted for such an offence),
or
(b) would be guilty of such an offence if section 12(2)(c) and (4)
were omitted.
(4) See section 8 for the meaning of a person associated with C and see
section 9 for a duty on the Secretary of State to publish guidance. 136
On the face of it, this offence does not create criminal liability for corporate
bribing (which is what is required by the Convention). 137 The offence is unusual
13 3 Press Release, Fin. Servs. Authority, FSA Fines Willis Limited £6.895 Million for
Anti-Bribery and Corruption Systems and Controls Failings (July 21, 2011), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2011/066.shtml.
134R v. BAE Systems PLC, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 16, [19], available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.ukl/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/r-v-bae-sentencing-
remarks.pdf.
135 And for details of the enforcement measures, see OECD, PHASE 3, supra note 124, at
72-74.
136 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.).
13 7 OECD Convention, supra note 44, at arts. 2, 3 & 7.
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in terms of the general principles of criminal law. It is not, strictly speaking, a
form of vicarious liability nor is it a substantive bribery offence. It does not
replace or remove direct corporate liability for bribery. If anything, in analytical
terms, it is an extension of the general law of complicity. If it can be proved that
someone representing the corporation as its "directing mind" bribes or receives
a bribe or encourages or assists someone else to do so, then it may be
appropriate to charge the organisation with a section 1 or 6 offence as an
alternative or in addition to any offence under section 7 (or a section 2 offence
if the offence relates to being bribed).
The new offence is of the "failure-to-prevent" type. It does not require
knowledge, intention, or recklessness. 138 The danger that is traditionally
ascribed to such offences is that they can generate liability without fault at all,
with the usual dangers of unwarranted prosecutions and wide prosecutorial
discretions. 13 9 Liability for omissions is usually only thought of as being
justified exceptionally, when there is reason to suppose the person made liable
should act, and then generally because of some sort of previous action of that
actor (starting the fire) 140 or the actor's status. Liability without a conscious
mental state is justifiable in circumstances when it is legitimate to say that the
actor ought to have known. 14 1 The point of framing the prohibition as it is in
section 7 is to place a clear onus upon the employer to do something to ensure
that employees do not engage in the proscribed activity.
Section 7 does not require a prosecution for the predicate offences under
section 1 or 6 to take place, but there needs to be sufficient evidence to prove
against the section 7 defendant, to the normal criminal standard, the commission
of such an offence. 142 The jurisdiction for this offence is wide. 143 Provided that
the commercial organisation is incorporated or formed in the United Kingdom,
or that the organisation carries out its business or part of its business in the
United Kingdom, courts in the U.K. will have jurisdiction, irrespective of where
in the world the acts or omissions which form part of the offence take place. 144
Crucially, a defence is provided where the commercial organisation can
show it had adequate procedures in place to prevent persons associated with it
from bribing. 145 This means that any organisation that does have in place
adequate procedures will avoid liability. The standard of proof the defendant
will need to satisfy to have the defence is the balance of probabilities. 146
13 8 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.).
139 DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 26 27
(2008).
140 R v. Miller, [1983] 2 A.C. 161 (H.L.) 175-76 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).
14 1 DAVID ORMEROD, SMITH AND HOGAN'S CRIMINAL LAW 146 (13th ed. 2011).
142 This follows from the absence of a contrary provision.
143 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 12 (U.K.).
144 Id.
14 5 1d. § 7(2).
1461d. § 7.
1202 [Vol. 73:5
THE U.K. BRIBERY ACT
Whether the procedures are adequate will ultimately be a matter for the courts
to decide on a case-by-case basis.
As stated in the Code for Crown Prosecutors, 147 prosecutors must consider
what the defence case may be and how it is likely to affect the prospects of
conviction during the evidential stage of the decision whether or not to
prosecute. 148 Clearly, the defence under section 7(2) of adequate procedures is
likely to be relevant when considering whether there is sufficient evidence to
provide a realistic prospect of conviction. Prosecutors must look carefully at all
the circumstances in which the alleged bribe occurred, including the adequacy
of any antibribery procedures. A single instance of bribery does not necessarily
mean that an organisation's procedures are inadequate. For example, the actions
of an agent or an employee may be wilfully contrary to very robust corporate
contractual requirements, instructions, or guidance. In such a case it is
appropriate that the blame fall on the individual.
An issue which is common to all areas of legal discourse is how much
guidance need the law give to its subjects as to how they should behave in order
to avoid falling foul of it. At its most basic the doctrine of the rule of law states
that law must be expressed with sufficient precision and clarity that people
should be able to order their affairs according to accurate predictions of the
consequences. 149 In criminal law, this is expressed by the maxim nulla poena
sine lege. 150 There is a subsidiary and debateable issue, not directly in point
here, whether this doctrine applies equally to procedural and evidential
requirements. 15 1 Other areas of law have developed, whether by courts or
legislation, "anti-avoidance" mechanisms, for instance to strike down shams or
otherwise to look to the substance and not the form of transactions, to look at
the commercial reality, or to deploy doctrines of "abuse of rights," 152 based on
considerations of good or bad faith or otherwise. 153 English criminal law has
only recently (and very dubiously) embraced the doctrine that ordering one's
14 7 CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., THE CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS § 4.5 (2010),
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code2010english.pdf.
14 8 The decision is usually said to have two stages-the evidential and the public
interest. The evidential test is sometimes characterised in numerical terms (e.g., Is there a
51% chance of a conviction?).
14 9 H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 23 (1968).
150 Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1937).
151 Michael Bohlander, Retrospective Reductions in the Severity of Substantive Criminal
Law: The Lex Mitior Principle and the Impact of Scoppola v Italy No. 2, 2011 CRIM. L. REV.
627, 628.
152 Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37, 95
(1995).
15 3 See generally Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Lav Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611
(2011).
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behaviour so as best to avoid liability can itself be regarded as criminal itself.154
It is hoped that this is an aberration.
Despite the redolence of the criminal codes of Stalin and Hitler, 155 there is
still in ordinary speech and in the law reports a body of pejorative references to
persons who do order their conduct by reference to the rules, so as to avoid
adverse consequence: "playing the system"; "looking for loopholes"; "shams";
"compliance with the letter and not the spirit"1 56 ; "sailing close to the wind."
There remains the question, expressed by Lord Morris, whether "[t]hose who
skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign which will denote the precise
spot where they may fall in."1 57 Three observations need to be made about this
apparent dichotomy. First, however hard legislators try, and however well they
do, it is impossible to write laws that allow every possible subsequent decision
made under the rules to be made with total predictability. As Hart pointed out,
"our relative ignorance of fact" and "relative indeterminacy of aim" stand in the
way. 158 Second, there is a range of attitudes that may be adopted towards a law
by someone who is seeking to avoid liability under any given law. There is, or
there may be, a difference between people acting in good faith to minimise their
liability to taxation consistently with a desire not to break the law and people
who will do anything lawful or otherwise not to pay. In criminal law, there may
be a difference between someone who sets out to obey the law at all costs and
the person who sets out to acquire a particular advantage irrespective of the
legality of the behaviour. Third, frequently some other method of
communicating the wishes of the legislator is better than the use of legislation.
We are used to the deployment of codes of practice like the Highway Code or
those published under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.159 These can
be expressed in language that is more easily comprehensible to the general
reader than can legislation. Different means of expression are available. It is
possible to use diagrams and worked examples far more easily in codes than in
legislation.
The issue that was debated throughout the process of the enactment of the
Act was whether or not any guidance should be given as to what might amount
to "adequate procedures."' 160 Some argued that it is a mistake to give any
guidance because anything at all that was said could be used by the corporations
154 Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010, c. 38, § 18 (U.K.) (creating an offence of
circumventing the prohibitions of the preceding few sections).
155 Hall, supra note 150, at 186 87.
15 6 For a discussion of the role of such references in shaping the law, see LEO KATZ, ILL-
GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 1-132
(1996).
15 7 Knuller Ltd. v. DPP, [1973] A.C. 435 (H.L.) 463 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).
15 8 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125 (1961).
159Road Traffic Act 1988, c. 52, § 38 (Gr. Brit.); Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984, c. 60, § 67 (Eng. & Wales).
160 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) (U.K.).
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at whom Section 7 was directed to find ways to comply with the letter but not
the spirit, to find loopholes, or otherwise to engage in "constructive
compliance." 16 1 It was suggested that the organisation should act entirely at its
own risk, and that if guidance were not given it would try harder than if
guidance were given, to which it might wish to do no more than minimally to
comply. 162 After debates, the government did decide to insert in the Bribery Bill
provisions placing a duty upon the Secretary of State to publish guidance about
procedures that relevant commercial organisations can put in place to prevent
persons associated with them from bribing, 163 and (by implication) to provide
themselves with a defence under section 7 in the event that such bribery
occurred.
The Colville Committee recognised that there needed to be guidance but
left a number of questions to be resolved.1 64 The first important question of
principle was whether the guidance should be on liability or on prosecution
policy. One recent development in English criminal law is the increased use of
published guidance on prosecution as a mechanism for reducing the rigour of
the law. 165 Before the Committee, the Director of Public Prosecutions drew a
clear distinction between prosecutorial practice and "compliance" issues such as
the meaning of "adequate procedures."' 166 He considered that the second type of
issue would be best addressed by informal industry-led guidance which
prosecutors and juries would then take into account when deciding whether to
charge or convict.1 67
The second issue was whether the guidance should come from the
Government or from within the organisation and to what extent it should be able
to be referred to in court. There are various mechanisms for causing guidance to
be legally relevant. One, like the Highway Code or the Codes of Practice under
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, is to specify that breach of the
guidance is not of itself a crime or a tort, but that the Code may be taken into
161DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, VOL. I , supra note 60, at para. 112 (U.K.). This was the
position adopted by the U.K. chapter of Transparency International. JOINT COMM. ON THE
DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, DRAFT BRIBERY BILL: FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 2008-09, 2008-9,
H.L. 115-11, H.C. 430-11, at Ev 284 85 (U.K.) [hereinafter DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, voL. 11],
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtbribe/115/
115ii.pdf.
16 2 DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, VOL. 1, supra note 60, at para. 112.
163 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 9 (U.K.).
16 4 DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, vol. 1, supra note 60, at para. 108.
165 Rightly or wrongly. R v. DPP, [2009] UKHL 45, [54] [56], [2010] 1 A.C. 345, 395
96 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales), gave rise to the guidance in policy for prosecutors in
respect of cases of encouraging or assisting suicide issued by the DPP in February 2010.
CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF
ENCOURAGING OR ASSISTING SUICIDE, at para. 4 (2010), available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/
publications/prosecution/assistedsuicidepolicy.pdf.
16 6 DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, supra note 60, at para. 111.
167 Id.
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account in determining other questions. 168 Another is to provide that breach of
such guidance is evidence of wrongdoing. Consultation then follows as to the
form that the guidance should take. 169
After debates, a decision was made to furnish guidance, and that was done
by the Ministry of Justice. 170 The guidance was eventually (because the
bringing into force of the Act was itself delayed and the guidance came into
force with the Act in July 2010) published by the Ministry of Justice. 17 1
Although criticised from some quarters, 172 the guidance is generally thought
helpful. 173 As to the status of the guidance, the Bribery Act 2010 is not explicit,
but the guidance itself states that:
The question of whether an organisation had adequate procedures in place to
prevent bribery in the context of a particular prosecution is a matter that can
only be resolved by the courts taking into account the particular facts and
circumstances of the case. The onus will remain on the organisation, in any
case where it seeks to rely on the defence, to prove that it had adequate
procedures in place to prevent bribery. However, departures from the
suggested procedures contained within the guidance will not of itself give rise
to a presumption that an organisation does not have adequate procedures. 174
The guidance provides some explanation of the government policy behind
the formulation of the offences and gives assistance on the particular concepts
relevant to the application of sections 1, 6, and 7 in the context of commercial
bribery. Prosecutors may find this helpful when reviewing cases involving
commercial bribery. Prosecutors must take it into account when considering
16 8 Road Traffic Act 1998, c. 60, § 38(7) (Gr. Brit.); Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984, c. 60, § 67(10) (Eng. & Wales).
16 9 See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CONSULTATION ON GUIDANCE ABOUT
COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS PREVENTING BRIBERY (SECTION 9 OF THE BRIBERY ACT 2010)
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/consultations/bribery-act-
guidance-consultation 1.pdf.
17 0 See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ABOUT COMMERCIAL
ORGANISATIONS PREVENTING BRIBERY (SECTION 9 OF THE BRIBERY ACT 2010) (2011)
[hereinafter MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ABOUT COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS],
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/consultations/bribery-response-
consultation.pdf.
171 See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE (2011)
[hereinafter GUIDANCE], available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation!
bribery-act-201 0-guidance.pdf.
172 Bruce W. Bean & Emma H. MacGuidwin, Expansive Reach Useless Guidance: An
Introduction to the UK. Bribery Act 2010, ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2037200.
173 See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ABOUT COMMERCIAL
ORGANISATIONS, supra note 170.
174 GUIDANCE, supra note 171, at 6.
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whether the procedures put in place by commercial organisations are adequate
to prevent persons performing services for them or on their behalf from bribing.
The six governing principles of the Guidance are as follows 75: First, there
must be proportionate procedures. "A commercial organisation's procedures to
prevent bribery by persons associated with it are [to be] proportionate to the
bribery risks it faces and to the nature, scale and complexity of the commercial
organisation's activities. They [must also be] clear, practical, accessible,
effectively implemented and enforced."'176
Second, "[t]he top-level management of a commercial organisation (be it a
board of directors, the owners or any other equivalent body or person) [must be]
committed to preventing bribery by persons associated with it," possibly by the
use of a champion at the highest level. 177 They foster a culture within the
organisation in which bribery is never acceptable. Third, the policies must be
risk based-that is, "[t]he commercial organisation [must assess] the nature and
extent of its exposure to potential external and internal risks of bribery on its
behalf by persons associated with it."'178 The assessment must be reiterated
periodically. 179 Fourth, the commercial organisation must apply due diligence
procedures to all "persons who perform or will perform services for or on behalf
of the organisation, in order to mitigate identified bribery risks."'180 Fifth, "[t]he
commercial organisation [should seek] to ensure that its bribery prevention
policies and procedures are embedded and understood throughout the
organisation through internal and external communication, including training,
that is proportionate to the risks it faces." 181 Last, "[t]he commercial
organisation monitors and reviews procedures designed to prevent bribery by
persons associated with it and makes improvements where necessary."] 82
These governing principles are helpful in informing the organisation how to
proceed, but more importantly the Guidance also incorporates some (very
useful) practical examples. How exactly should organisations guide against the
most obvious possibilities? For reasons of space this Article will treat three
examples.
Facilitation Payments: One of the areas of greatest practical concern is the
case-lawful under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-of so-called
"facilitation payments," that is, relatively small payments to deal with some
threat to the eventuation of the transaction.1 83 The example used most
frequently is that of a payment to dockers or port authorities to get a perishable
1751d. at 20.
176 1d. at 21.
177 Id. at 23.
178Id. at 25.
179 Id.
180 GUIDANCE, supra note 171, at 27.
18 11Id. at 29.
182Id. at 31.
18 3 d. at 18.
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or otherwise urgent cargo off a dock. The combination of the urgency and the
relative smallness of the bribe, with the potentially catastrophic consequences
faced, is sometimes used to justify laxness in this regard. What is required is
training: properly communicating the policy of nonpayment of facilitation
payments and training staff about resisting demands for facilitation payments;
(where necessary) providing advice on the local law relating to certificates of
inspection and fees for these to differentiate between properly payable fees and
disguised requests for facilitation payments; and creating schedules for the
project so that shipping, importation, and delivery schedules allow where
feasible for resisting and testing demands for facilitation payments. The
corporation should have in place accounting procedures to minimise the risk of
hidden payments questioning of legitimacy of demands; it should try to avoid
paying "inspection fees" (if not properly due) in cash and directly to an official;
it should request receipts and identification details of the official making the
demand; and it should have in place internal procedures, which may include one
or more of the following, if appropriate: requesting to consult with superior
officials, informing those demanding payments that compliance with the
demand may mean that a company (and possibly its agent) will commit an
offence under U.K. law, and informing those demanding payments that it will
be necessary to inform the U.K. embassy of the demand. This will trigger the
obvious general consideration that these sorts of payments are generally only
sought covertly. It may also be possible to use U.K. diplomatic channels or
participation in locally active nongovernmental organisations, so as to apply
pressure on the authorities of the destination country to take action to stop
demands for facilitation payments.
Corporate Hospitality.- Another cause of uncertainty in the law prior to the
Act was the case of corporate gifts, including hospitality. It is very difficult to
distinguish expenditure on hospitality, which can be justified by reference to the
legitimate interests of both concerns in better relations between their employees
and corrupt attempts to secure contracts. How is the distinction to be made and
the boundary policed? A range of techniques are suggested. It is important that
there be a published policy statement committing a corporation to transparent,
proportionate, reasonable, and bona fide hospitality and promotional
expenditure. Such a policy should include internal guidance, which must
provide that any procedures are designed to seek to ensure transparency and
conformity with any applicable laws and codes; that any hospitality should
reflect a desire to cement good relations and show appreciation; that
promotional expenditure should seek to improve the image of the commercial
organisation; and, critically, that recipients should not be given the impression
that they are under an obligation to confer any business advantage or that the
recipients' independence will be affected. Guidance should set out criteria to be
applied when deciding the appropriate levels of hospitality for both private and
public business partners, clients, suppliers, and foreign public officials, and the
type of hospitality that is appropriate in different sets of circumstances. When
dealing abroad, a corporation's provision of hospitality for public officials
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should be cleared with the relevant public body so that it is clear whom and
what the hospitality is for, and the internal guidance should set limits above
which senior managerial approval is required, precisely a reliable rules for
accounting and regular monitoring.
Complicated Transactions: The final common theme against which
corporations must guard is that of bribes remaining unidentified amidst
complicated transactions, especially those that involve some elements of
community benefits and charitable donations. These are the cases where the
acquisition of a contract is linked to benign investment in the jurisdiction-for
example, the building of schools and hospitals collateral to a foreign mining
operation. In these cases the prescription includes making efforts to conduct due
diligence, including consultation with staff members and any business partners
the corporation has in the country in order to satisfy itself that the suggested
arrangement is legitimate and in conformity with any relevant laws and codes
applying to the foreign public official responsible for approving the product,
and adopting an internal communication plan designed to ensure that any
relationships with charitable organisations are conducted in a transparent and
open manner and do not raise any expectation of the award of a contract or
licence. Collateral policies which should be considered include adopting
company-wide policies and procedures about the selection of charitable projects
or initiatives and informing those policies by appropriate risk assessments. If
charitable donations made in a given country are routinely channelled through
government officials or to others at the official's request, a red flag should be
raised and the corporation may seek to monitor the way its contributions are
ultimately applied or investigate alternative methods of donation, such as
official "off-set" or "community gain" arrangements with the local government.
Again, transparency is the key. Of course, all these procedures are far easier to
suggest in the abstract than to operate when the issues actually arise.
Nonetheless when taken in the round, the Guidance and the attention it draws to
the importance of appropriate internal procedures are very much to be
welcomed.
The shift underpinning the introduction of section 7 is also one in the
allocation of responsibility for enforcement. In recent years there has been a
move in a number of areas to "third party policing," that is, the shifting of some
of the burdens of policing away from the established state institutions (police
forces or regulators) onto institutions (usually private-sector institutions) within
the sector under consideration. 184 This has an evident financial advantage to the
authorities but can also be argued to be more efficient. The body with the
incentive to put in place adequate procedures is closer and has more day-to-day
contact with the individuals for whom it is made responsible than the regular
enforcement authorities, and it is far better placed to be proactive and to give
specific guidance. This part of the legislation was never intended primarily to
184 LORRAINE MAZEROLLE & JANET RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY POLICING 2 (2005).
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give rise to prosecutions and arguments in courts as to whether a given
corporation had in place adequate procedures. Rather the effect will be that all
major corporations include these procedures in their corporate-governance
compliance procedures and that inclusion will impact significantly upon the
primary rates of offending by employees.
VIII. PLEA AGREEMENTS, BRIBERY PROSECUTIONS, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ELEMENT
There is no clearer case of bribery, whatever the age of the laws and
whatever the jurisdiction, than that of paying someone not to prosecute the
briber for an offence s/he is alleged to have committed. If a person is able to pay
to avoid criminal liability then s/he is not really subject to the criminal law at
all. Yet every system of criminal justice develops some mechanism for
diverting cases away from the most resource-intensive mechanisms furnished
for their resolution. One of the respects, traditionally, in which comparisons
have been drawn between criminal justice systems in the United States and
England and Wales is in the use of plea agreements. 185
Some departure from the traditional "no bargains" rule is now permitted by
statute. Under the "plea before venue system,"
[t]he accused is entitled to request an indication of sentence, whether "a
custodial sentence or noncustodial sentence would be more likely to be
imposed if he were to be tried summarily.., and to plead guilty." The court is
entitled, but not obliged, to respond to such a request. In short, there is no
longer any absolute prohibition against an advance indication of sentence.1 86
In cartel offences under the enforcement authority of the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT), bargains of some sorts have been permitted. 187 The question is whether
and how this should be extended to bribery offences.
18 5 See Peter Alldridge, Bribery and the Changing Pattern of Criminal Prosecution, in
Modern Bribery Law, supra note 117.
186R v. Goodyear, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 888, [45], [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2532 [2539] (Eng.)
(quoting Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, sched. 3, available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uldukpga/2003/44/pdfs/ukpga 20030044 en.pdf). "In Schedule 3 to the Criminal
Justice Act 2003, dealing with the allocation of cases triable either way, and sending cases to
the Crown Court, paragraph 6, substituting section 20 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980,
addresses the procedure where summary trial appears more suitable." Id. at [45] [46], 2539.
Venue is significant because of the differing sentencing powers of the Magistrates' and
Crown Courts. Magistrates' Courts may not pass custodial sentences longer than six months.
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, c. 43, § 31 (Eng. & Wales), available at http:/www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/43/pdfs/ukpga 19800043 en.pdf.
187Jon Lawrence, Michael O'Kane, Suzanne Rab & Jasvinder Nakhwal, Hardcore
Bargains: What Could Plea Bargaining Offer in UK Criminal Cartel Cases?, 1
COMPETITION L.J. 17, 34 (2008).
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Following the guidance published by the Sentencing Guidelines Council in
December 2004,188 in Goodyear,189 adopting the procedure in Attorney-
General's Reference (No. 1 of 2004)190 and Simpson,19 1 a five-judge Court of
Appeal, presided over by the Lord Chief Justice, was convened to consider
whether the Turner rule of practice should be modified and, if so, to what
extent. 192 It laid down new guidelines which state that, normally speaking, an
indication of sentence should not be given until the basis of the plea has been
agreed or the judge has concluded that he or she can properly deal with the case
without the need for a trial of the issue. The plea and case management hearing
in the Crown Court now specifically requires the judge to seek and be given
first, whether the defendant has in fact been advised about the credit to be
obtained for a guilty plea, and second, what steps have been taken to see
whether the case might be resolved without a trial. 193
In McKinnon v. United States, the lower court expressed "a degree of
distaste" for the way in which plea negotiations had taken place but said that
these "cultural reservations" were not such that extradition should not take
place. 194 The House of Lords, when considering the same case, found that the
differences between the system in the United Kingdom and the United States
were not as stark as was sought to be portrayed and found the comments of the
High Court to be too "fastidious."] 95
The matter, especially in the area of economic crime, is politically sensitive.
The last few years have seen a contrast between the attitude of the Director of
the Serious Fraud Office, Richard Alderman, and the courts, in particular the
judges at Southwark Crown Court (where most fraud prosecutions in England
and Wales take place) and, especially, Lord Justice Thomas, the President of the
Queen's Bench Division. Alderman inherited a very poor record of prosecutions
in serious fraud cases. 196 The dispute centred around Innospec.197 In this case
188 SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA:
DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE 5 7 (2007).
189 Goodyear, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 888 at [1] [3], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2533.
190 A-G's Reference, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1025, [9], [2004] 1 W.L.R. 2111, 2119 20.
19 1 R v. Simpson, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 1499, [21], [2004] Q.B. 118, 126.
192 Goodyear, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 888 at [1]-[3], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2533.
193 Goodyear, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 888 at [45]-[46], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2539.
194 McKinnon v. United States, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 762, [54], [60], available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2007/762.html.
19 5 McKinnon v. United States, [2008] UKHL 59, [37], [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1739, 1749 50
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).
196 Ruth Sunderland, Serious Fraud Qffice Hits a Zenith with Its Victory over Asil Nadir,
THIS IS MONEY.CO.UIK (Aug. 23, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.thisismoney.co.ul/money
/news/article-2192752/Serious-Fraud-Office-hits-zenith-victory-Asil-Nadir.html#ixzz24
vlmoRBn.
197 See generally R v. Innospec Ltd., [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 7, available at http:/
www.judiciary.gov.ul /Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sentencing-remarks-thomas-
2012]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
an agreement had been arrived at between the U.S. Department of Justice, the
SFO, and the defendants whereby a series of guilty pleas, fines, confiscation
orders, and civil recovery orders were to be presented to a judge, in effect, for
ratification. 198 Lord Justice Thomas was very firm both in rejecting such a
restricted view of the role of the judge and in refusing to differentiate between
types of serious crime:
It is of the greatest public interest that the serious criminality of any, including
companies, who engage in the corruption of foreign governments, is made
patent for all to see by the imposition of criminal and not civil sanctions. It
would be inconsistent with basic principles of justice for the criminality of
corporations to be glossed over by a civil as opposed to a criminal sanction. 199
Of the sentencing role of the judge in general, in what is rapidly becoming a
locus classicus, Lord Justice Thomas said,
[T]he imposition of a sentence is a matter for the judiciary .... It is in the
public interest, particularly in relation to the crime of corruption, that although,
in accordance with the Practice Direction, there may be discussion and
agreement as to the basis of plea, a court must rigorously scrutinise in open
court in the interests of transparency and good governance the basis of that
plea and to see whether it reflects the public interest.200
As a consequence of these statements, the SFO's policy of deal making was
much more closely circumscribed. Notwithstanding Innospec, we can expect to
see greater use of deal making with corporate defendants and for those deals to
include civil recovery, 20 1 but deal making should not take place unconstrained.
Lord Justice Thomas in Innospec and Mr. Justice Bean in BAE Systems each
consented to the deal that had been struck between prosecutor and defendant,
but neither was happy about it.202 If this practice of negotiation is to continue or
lj-innospec.pdf. See also R v. Dougall, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1048, [26], available at
http:/ /www.bailii.org/ew /cases/EWCA/Crim/2010/ 1048.html.
19 8 fnnospec, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 7 at [7]-[8].
199 Id. at [38] (emphasis added).200 1d. at [27]; see also R v. BAE Systems PLC, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 16, [13],
available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/r-v-bae-
sentencing-remarks.pdf.
201BAE Systems, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 16 at [13]. The BAE court held:
The Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction section IV.45 and the decision of the
Court of Appeal in R v Underwood [2004] EWCA Crim 2256 establish that whether or
not pleas have been agreed the judge is not bound by any such agreement, and that any
view formed by the prosecution on a proposed basis of plea is deemed to be conditional
of the Judge's acceptance of the basis of plea.
Id.
202 fnnospec, [2010] EW Misc 7 at [42]; BAE Systems, [2010] EW Misc 16 at [6].
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increase a series of issues will need to be addressed. The first is the general one
of the appropriate role of the judge in sentencing. Even though it bears many of
the hallmarks of an executive function, the judicial discretion in sentencing is
maintained to be one of the stigmata of the independent judicial role, and it is
one of which judges in England and Wales are fiercely protective.
Second, proper attention needs to be given to the basis for plea. Lord Justice
Thomas in Innospec and Mr. Justice Bean in BAE Systems were both critical of
the factual basis upon which the agreements constrained them to pass
sentence. 20 3 Most obviously, Mr. Justice Bean had to sentence on the technical
regulatory charge of failing to keep proper accounts, whereas the evidence
seemed to point very strongly to an offence of bribery. 204 This was wholly
artificial and offends the general considerations of transparency and publicity. It
would be unacceptable for defendants to be able to buy their way out of adverse
publicity or convictions of offences of an appropriate gravity to the conduct in
question. The judges eventually allowed the case to proceed to sentence on the
agreed basis but made it clear that there may be cases in which the charges were
so inappropriate that the judge ought not to let the case proceed.20 5 Likewise, in
Innospec, the judge (quite correctly) criticised the fact that the wording of the
SFO press release to be published at the time of the announcement of the
settlement had formed part of the deal. 20 6
The third major consideration in putting in place appropriate rules for deal
making is the penalty "on offer." The incentive for pleading guilty should be a
reduced sentence and not, at least in the first instance, a civil recovery order.
When civil recovery orders were introduced they were a fallback mechanism to
deal with the case where criminal proceedings could not successfully be
brought. 207 Now this sequential relationship has been changed to one in which
civil recovery can supplement or provide an alternative to criminal
proceedings. 208 The calculation is more complex, and the possibility of the
power of money operating to prevent adverse publicity and the other effects of
convictions is a clear one to which regard must be had. The existence of civil
recovery as a mechanism threatens the power of the judge to give effect to the
denunciatory role of the criminal law because, in principle, it makes the matter a
203Innospec, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 7 at [40]; BAE Systems, [2010] EW Misc
(Crown) 16 at [8].204 BAE Systems, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 16 at [2], [8].
20 5 lnnospec, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 7 at [25.iii]; BAE Systems, [2010] EW Misc
(Crown) 16 at [13].
206 Innospec, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 7 at [50].
2 0 7 PETER ALLDRIDGE, MONEY LAUNDERING LAW: FORFEITURE, CONFISCATION,
CRIMINAL LAUNDERING AND TAXATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME 239-40 (2003).
208 Serious Crime Act 2007, c. 27, § 74, sched. 8 & 9 (U.K.), available at http:H
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/27/pdfs/ukpga 20070027_en.pdf (amending Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002, c. 29, §§ 1 5, sched. 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.
gov.ulr ukpga/2002/29/pdfs/ukpga 20020029 en.pdf).
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civil one, and so long as it is civil it is susceptible to agreement between civil
parties. 20
9
Most of Lord Justice Thomas's objections to the deal that the SFO had
made in Innospec were to deals between prosecution and defendant and, in
particular, to what he regarded as a usurpation of the appropriate role of the
courts. 2 10 To encompass the international dimension, the additional feature that
must be addressed is that international dealing should not be permitted to extend
to overseas prosecutors dictating the criminal justice policy of the United
Kingdom, any more than to overseas diplomats. Reliable and transparent
mechanisms must be in place to determine priorities between countries asserting
jurisdiction. Global plea agreements can only work if plea agreements work. It
is no coincidence that Innospec and BAE Systems both involve U.S. and U.K.
prosecutors, and the relationship between the Department of Justice and the
Serious Fraud Office. Guidance has been published for handling criminal cases
with concurrent jurisdiction between the United Kingdom and the United
States. 2 11 This relationship can only work if the "Alderman" line of negotiating
with defendants is followed.
An additional consideration is provided by the operation of the U.K.-U.S.
extradition treaty. The treaty has been in point recently, partly as a result of the
numbers and partly as a result of the high profile cases in which extraditions
have been challenged. 2 12 A recent review found there to be no significant
difference between the relevant legal tests (respectively, the "probable cause"
test and the "reasonable suspicion" tests).2 13 The problems that have arisen in
the United Kingdom in these cases have generally been as a result of the use of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States.2 14 That is outside the scope of
this Article.
Notwithstanding the approach of Lord Justice Thomas, we can expect that if
bribery law is to be enforced, Alderman's approach will prevail. Alderman has
209 Albeit in accordance with the guidance.
2 10 1nnospec, [2010] EW Misc (Crown) 7 at [26].
211 R v. DPP, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 666, [15], available at http://www.bailli.org/ew/
cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/666.html; Kate Brookson-Morris, Conflicts of Criminal
Jurisdiction, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 659, 660 (2007).
2 12 Tappin v. United States, [2012] EWHC (Admin) 22, [1], available at
http://www'judiciary.gov.ukl/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/tappin-v-usa.pdf;
McKinnon v. United States, [2008] UKHL 59, [6] [7], [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1739, 1742 (appeal
taken from Eng. & Wales); R v. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Office, [2006] EWHC (Admin)
200, [1], [2007] Q.B. 727, 731.
213 HOME OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S EXTRADITION ARRANGEMENTS
242 (2011), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police/operational-
policing/extradition-review?view-Binary; see also JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF UK EXTRADITION POLICY, 2010-12, H.L. 156, H.C. 767,
(U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.ukl/pa/jt20O1012/jtselect/jtrights/156/
156.pdf.
2 14 The FCPA is one such piece of legislation.
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now departed, succeeded by David Green, QC.2 15 A paper promised
consultation by the Attorney-General's Office on Deferred Prosecution
Agreements 2 16 has now been published and, at the time of writing, is subject to
consultation. 2 17 The proposal is for the introduction of deferred prosecution
agreements as a possibility for the prosecutor to use where the corporation
proposes, in effect, to turn over a new leaf. The idea is that where a corporation
approaches the prosecuting authority then an agreement may be entered into and
approved by a court not to proceed directly with criminal charges but to leave
those charges pending for a given period, upon successful compliance with
conditions laid down in the agreement. 218 These conditions may include a
financial penalty, restitution to victims, and disgorgement of profits, but also
some proactive measures to prevent future wrongdoing.2 19 This would be a
further enlistment of the corporation in self-policing, thus, shifting the costs of
policing and criminal justice away from the principal prosecuting body. It
would be a useful addition to the armoury of the prosecutor.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Article has shown how the United Kingdom came to have its Bribery
Act 2010 and has considered the offence of failing to prevent bribery by an
employee and, in particular, the "adequate procedures" defence. The Article has
also explored developments in the prosecution process, in particular,
mechanisms for providing incentives to corporations to police themselves. The
purpose of this Article is to draw attention, in particular, to four aspects of these
developments.
First, and most important, as a piece of new law the Bribery Act 2010 is to
be welcomed. It is better to have rational defensible law than irrational
indefensible law.
Second, as a socio-legal study of recent legal history, the saga shows how
badly things can go wrong and how they can adversely affect international
relations, and it emphasises the element of chance in legal developments. There
was never any particular reason why the 2003 Bill need have been so poor, or
why it took so long to put in place efforts to rectify its defects. In seeking
reasons for the delays and the wrong turnings, we should not look for
conspiracies or for great forces at play in these events. From time to time, even
2 1 5 Director, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/who-we-are/
director.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
216 20 Mar. 2012, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2012) 650 (U.K.).
2 17 See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CONSULTATION ON A NEW ENFORCEMENT TOOL
To DEAL WITH ECONOMIC CRIME COMMITTED BY COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS: DEFERRED
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (2012), available at http://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-
communications/deferred-prosecution-agreements.2 181d. at para. 15.
2 1 9 1Id. at para. 88.
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the most admirably motivated and highly qualified individual agents get things
wrong, and from time to time developments in one area are influenced by those
in another. Stuff, as Mr. Rumsfeld reminded us, happens. 220
Third, as to practical significance of the Act moving forward, there has only
been one prosecution thus far under the Bribery Act and that one of such a
quotidian nature that it certainly did not require the legislation. A newspaper
sting caught a court clerk who was taking bribes to write off driving offences. 22 1
There have been no prosecutions under section 7. The real impact will not be
measured in successful prosecutions, but in the importation into corporate
governance of antibribery systems. That is not a bad thing.
Lastly, criminal law and international relations will become increasingly
intertwined. We do not need globally homogenised criminal law and criminal
justice. Criminal law has traditionally been one of the areas in which sovereign
nations assert their individuality. Nonetheless, in this, as in other areas, they
must increasingly work together, and bribery will be one of the principal areas
of collaboration for the foreseeable future.
220 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and
Gen. Myers (Apr. 11, 2003, 2:00 PM) (transcript available at http://www.defense.gov/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid-2367).
221 R v. Patel, No. 2011/07001/AB, 2012 WL 1933501, at *[3] (EWCA (Crim) May 24,
2012).
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